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TALKING ABOUT CRUELTY: 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AFTER MILLER v. ALABAMA 
Samuel H. Pillsbury* 
  
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; volunteer chaplain, Los Angeles 
County jails and juvenile detention halls. My thanks to Michael Kennedy, S.J., and Arturo Lopez 
of Jesuit Restorative Justice for helping me and my wife, Linda Goodman Pillsbury, LCSW, 
bring a trauma and spirituality program to the Barry J. Niedorf Juvenile Hall in Sylmar, 
California, in the summer of 2012 for adolescents facing long sentences, including life in prison. 
My greatest thanks go to the young men who participated in this program. Their experiences have 
helped shape my understanding of the issues involved and the arguments presented here. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We need to talk about cruelty. If the subject is the constitutional 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments, then we need to talk about 
cruelty. If the subject is life sentences for juvenile killers, then we 
should talk about cruelty. 
In a trio of cases, Roper v. Simmons,1 Graham v. Florida,2 and 
most recently, Miller v. Alabama,3 the United States Supreme Court 
has developed a jurisprudence of proportionality to limit the 
punishment of juvenile offenders. A majority of Justices (a bare 
majority of five, it must be said) has struck down three different 
categories of punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen: the 
death penalty for murder (Roper),4 life without chance of parole for 
nonhomicide offenses (Graham), and mandatory life without chance 
of parole for first-degree murder (Miller). 
In these cases the Court has looked to a number of factors to 
assess constitutional proportionality, most importantly the science of 
brain development as it applies to adolescents, and national 
consensus as reflected in legislation and punishment practices. These 
factors seem to promise an objective means of assessing punishment 
for constitutional purposes. They also avoid talk about cruelty, the 
central normative term in the constitutional rule being applied.5 
 
 1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 4. I follow the standard naming practice of referring to this case by the shorthand title of 
Roper. It does seem odd, though, that citation rules should name the case after Donald P. Roper, 
superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center in Missouri who was named in the habeas case 
because he headed the Missouri prison that held the habeas petitioner, rather than Christopher 
Simmons, who was the habeas petitioner and original defendant convicted of murder. 
 5. Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, suggested that the word unusual in the 
constitutional text might have normative force, arguing that because there was no national 
consensus against the laws challenged in Arkansas and Alabama, life without chance of parole 
sentences for juvenile offenders for first-degree murder could not be deemed unusual. See Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2477. For the argument that in its early usage, unusual referred to unprecedented 
increases in punishments, see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1810–11 (2008). For other 
efforts to give cruelty normative content in Eighth Amendment punishment analyses, see Meghan 
J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81 (2010). See also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, 
Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Mary Sigler, The 
Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2011) (“[T]he touchstone 
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If avoiding cruelty talk is the price we must pay for the holdings 
of Roper, Graham, and Miller, so be it. Holdings matter more than 
rationales, and I believe these holdings morally and constitutionally 
sound. I will particularly argue in support of the Miller holding here. 
Yet without addressing cruelty, two critical pieces of the discussion 
go missing. 
The essential question with respect to juvenile perpetrators of 
serious violence is: How can we properly punish the cruelest of 
crimes without ourselves resorting to cruelty? In this question we see 
two often opposed but absolutely related aspects of cruelty: first, the 
potential cruelty of extreme penalties for teenagers and second, the 
cruelty of the criminal violence that lawful punishment serves to 
condemn. In the Eighth Amendment discussion, the tendency is to 
focus on one of these cruelties, largely to the exclusion of the other. 
But both are important. 
The move to cruelty as a constitutional norm requires 
consideration of the moral responsibility of both punisher and 
offender. In the contemporary United States, moral responsibility is 
often seen as a matter of personal values or politics or both rather 
than the stuff of constitutional law.6 The application of moral 
principles to crime and punishment is normally seen as the province 
of elected lawmakers: legislators and executives. This helps explain 
why the Court does not rely on explicitly moral reasoning in its 
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, I believe 
moral responsibility is at the heart of issues of cruelty in punishment. 
In the long run, whether juvenile offenders should be ordered to die 
in prison—the legal intent of a life without chance of parole 
sentence—depends in significant measure on the assessment of 
cruelty in both crime and punishment. 
The move to cruelty does not provide definitive, final answers to 
severe punishment questions. Others may use cruelty talk to support 
outcomes exactly opposed to those I advocate here. The value of the 
move lies not, primarily, in deciding outcomes, but in addressing a 
 
of Eighth Amendment analysis . . . is the political morality of our liberal democracy—the best 
account of how our political values should shape and constrain the institute of punishment.”). 
 6. Justices Thomas and Scalia have made this point especially strongly in recent dissents. 
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2055 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 615–16 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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fundamental aspect of the matter in question. Once more: If the 
question involves cruelty, we should talk about it. 
My argument proceeds as follows. After setting up the issues 
and approach of the majority in Miller, we turn to the possibilities of 
cruelty as a constitutional norm. This begins with a look at cruelty 
historically, focusing on cruelty as an important moral and political 
norm for both Enlightenment thinkers influential on American 
thought in the late eighteenth century and its importance in the new 
American Republic’s first modern innovation in punishment: the 
penitentiary. Next we look to the basic meaning of cruelty as a moral 
norm which condemns both sadism and indifference toward the 
serious suffering of others. This norm supports the Miller conclusion 
that mandatory life without chance of parole (commonly called 
“LWOP”) sentences for certain juvenile offenders are cruel, but does 
so by means of a judgment that such sentences mandate a form of 
culpable indifference to individual value that constitutes cruelty. The 
Essay closes with a consideration of how a cruelty norm may guide 
courts in resolving the constitutionality of a life without chance of 
parole sentence for juveniles by a court that possesses the 
discretionary power to order a lesser sentence. The cruelty norm set 
out here would find a life sentence for a juvenile unconstitutional 
unless there was a subsequent opportunity for the offender to seek 
later release based on a demonstration of personal reform. Otherwise, 
a life sentence would disregard the basic value of the offender in the 
person that he or she might become. 
II.  MILLER, IN SHORT 
In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a mandatory sentence of life without chance of 
parole for offenders who commit crimes under the age of eighteen. In 
two cases, one from Alabama and the other from Arkansas, the Court 
struck down laws that required a juvenile convicted of first-degree 
murder in adult court to receive LWOP. In both instances, the state 
had originally provided sentencers with a choice of ordering death or 
life without parole for such murder.7 The Roper decision eliminated 
 
 7. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460–63; ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(a), 13A-6-2(c) (1982); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (1997). 
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the death penalty, making LWOP the only sentence possible for 
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in both states. 
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority in Miller, found that 
mandatory life without chance of parole for juveniles violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.8 The Court relied on the precedents of Roper and 
Graham, as well as the Court’s much earlier cases requiring 
individualized sentencing in death cases. These latter cases bar 
mandatory capital punishment based on type of offense. 
In its trio of juvenile punishment cases, the Court has started to 
develop an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that echoes some of its 
death penalty jurisprudence of a generation earlier. In its earlier 
death cases, the Court repeatedly held that death is different as a 
penalty, and as a result the Court established substantive and 
procedural requirements not found in any other kind of criminal case. 
The motto for the Court’s new line of cases must be: teens are 
different.9 Or, to use the nomenclature of Justice Kagan and most 
advocates for juvenile offenders, children are different.10 Juvenile 
offenders are different than adult offenders by virtue of their youth, 
and at least with respect to the most severe punishments, must be 
treated differently by the criminal law. 
 
 8. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477. 
 9. “So if . . . ‘death is different,’ children are different too.” Id. at 2470. 
 10. Id. In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote: “The category of murderers that the Court 
delicately calls ‘children’ (murderers under the age of 18) consists overwhelmingly of young men 
who are fast approaching the legal age of adulthood.” Id. at 2489. Here, I use the terms youth or 
teen primarily because these are more common terms, in contemporary conversation, for persons 
aged fourteen through seventeen than “children.” It has been my observation that teenagers do not 
generally like to be called “children.” I certainly did not like it when I was that age. 
  A difficulty not addressed by the Court is the complexity of age as a marker of maturity. 
We commonly distinguish between chronologic and emotional or intellectual state of 
development, as by the judgment that one seems remarkably mature for their years, or, young 
(immature) for their age. Youth tried as adults in the criminal justice system present remarkable 
challenges to standard assessments of relative experience and development. In terms of life 
experience, including experiences of violence, trauma, drugs and alcohol, sex and parenting, they 
are often far more experienced than peers, indeed more experienced than many adults. In terms of 
emotional and intellectual development, though, they often lag behind peers, at least in some 
respects. 
  A quick story to illustrate: Recently I was in juvenile hall doing a program with a youth 
being tried as an adult and observed a female guard sarcastically yelling at youth forming up to go 
outside for recreation, reprimanding them for acting like two-year-olds. She added, something to 
the effect of, “Don’t be such kids,” and then added, as if to herself. “Oh, you are.” 
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From Roper through Miller, a five-Justice majority on the Court 
has found significant support for its holdings in the science of 
adolescent brain development.11 Researchers utilizing new 
technology and methods have produced a wealth of new data to 
support and explain age-old observations about teenagers. During the 
teen years, individuals are much more likely to be reckless and 
impulsive; they are much more heavily influenced by peers then they 
will be in later years.12 These distinctions are the result of stages in 
brain development. The brain does not fully develop until early 
adulthood in the mid-twenties, with the last stage of development 
involving the prefrontal cortex. This is the region of the brain tasked 
with executive decision-making functions and is therefore arguably 
the most important to responsible conduct.13 
Because of their youth, the Court has found teenage offenders 
less culpable: less capable of insight and self-control. Their criminal 
conduct is less indicative of fixed criminal character because of the 
greater likelihood that they will change as they grow to adulthood.14 
The impulsivity of youth also makes them less deterrable, because 
they are less likely to engage in the calculation of consequences that 
deterrent theory presumes. The Court has also observed in its recent 
cases that because of youth, sentencing judges have less ability to 
predict the future dangerousness of the offender.15 
The Court concluded in Miller that laws that mandate LWOP for 
juvenile offenders make no sense because they do not permit 
decision makers to take account of the differences between juvenile 
offenders and adults.16 Having established that these differences are 
relevant to punishment decision-making, the Court concluded that 
 
 11. Id. at 2464–65. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. “The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less 
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of 
irretrievably depraved character.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2004); see also Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2468; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (explaining that because 
juveniles are less mature and less likely to understand the consequences of their actions, their 
heinous crimes are not indicative of irreparable corruption). 
 15. This was an important aspect of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in both Roper and Graham. 
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
 16. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
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they must be considered in sentencing.17 The Court found major 
support for this final step in its reasoning in a line of cases that began 
with Woodson v. North Carolina18 in which the Court required 
individualized sentencing in capital cases.19 In Woodson and its 
progeny, the Court held that due to the unique severity of the death 
penalty, defendants had the right to a meaningful opportunity to 
present mitigation evidence and arguments.20 This would be 
precluded if the death penalty was automatic based on the crime of 
conviction.21 Therefore, no death penalty could be required based 
simply on conviction. In Miller, the Court found these precedents 
apposite, noting that for juveniles, a life without chance of parole 
sentence was not only the most severe that juveniles could suffer, but 
was effectively more severe than the same sentence given adult 
offenders, by virtue of both the total number of years served in 
prison and percentage of life spent incarcerated.22 Again, given these 
differences, juveniles require distinct treatment. 
Also important to the Court’s juvenile punishment jurisprudence 
has been an examination of so-called consensus evidence: an 
analysis of national trends, and sometimes international practice, 
with respect to particular forms of punishment of young offenders.23 
This was a factor significantly relied upon in Roper where the Court 
noted the rarity of juvenile death penalty provisions and juvenile 
executions in the United States, and the even greater rarity of the 
penalty in the rest of the world.24 It was also a factor in Graham, 
where the Court noted how unusual a life without chance of parole 
sentence was for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense.25 In 
Miller, while the majority cited national and international trend 
 
 17. Id. at 2469. 
 18. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 19. Id. at 304. 
 20. Id. at 304–05. 
 21. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 
(1982); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
(1982) (vacating death sentence imposed on a sixteen year old because the court failed to consider 
mitigating circumstances in sentencing); Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(reversing death sentence because Ohio statute did not give the sentencing judge a “full 
opportunity” to consider mitigating circumstances in sentencing). 
 22. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–69, 576–78 (2005). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–26. 
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evidence in support of its holding, the Court did not explicitly rely 
upon consensus data as in previous cases.26 (Writing for himself and 
three other Justices, Chief Justice Roberts found the majority’s 
decision ungrounded largely because it lacked support in the kind of 
national trend evidence that the Court had previously found critical 
to Eighth Amendment analysis in Graham and Roper.27 At the time 
of Miller, a large number of states provided for juvenile LWOP 
sentences and twenty nine made such sentences mandatory on a 
juvenile’s conviction in adult court of first-degree murder.28) 
Because the existence of a national consensus was not critical to the 
Miller Court’s reasoning and is not relevant to the cruelty analysis 
proposed here, it will play only a small part in the discussion that 
follows. 
In Miller, as in its earlier juvenile punishment cases, the Court 
did not consider cruelty as a constitutional norm. The Court’s current 
proportionality analysis is predicated on the notion that a significant 
disproportion between punishment level and level of offender 
desert/dangerousness constitutes a cruel punishment. That is, grossly 
disproportionate punishment is cruel.29 A cruel punishment in this 
sense is one that is excessive.30 Under this approach, the analytic 
action lies in the assessment of proportionality factors; cruel just 
serves as the label for the final decision, whether constitutional or 
unconstitutional. Cruelty itself is not normative. 
I believe we should use cruelty as a norm to assess the 
imposition of severe punishment. It promises to give Eighth 
Amendment analysis more textual and historical grounding than 
current approaches. And, at least in some cases, its moral focus will 
provide a critical norm to guide constitutional decisions. We will see 
that the cruelty norm suggested here provides another perspective on 
the mandatory life controversy in Miller and may also guide us in 
assessing future discretionary life sentences given juvenile offenders. 
 
 26. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470–75. 
 27. Id. at 2478–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 2471 (majority opinion). 
 29. Id. at 2463–64. 
 30. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 938–61 (2011) (presenting an extended historical 
argument for reading the cruel aspect of the clause as meaning a punishment disproportionate to 
the severity of the crime). 
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III.  THE EARLY RHETORIC OF 
CRUELTY IN AMERICA 
The question of how to punish violent crime is not a new one. 
Moral and political debates about this issue were prominent during 
the creation of the American nation, which followed the American 
Revolution in the late eighteenth century and continued well into the 
early nineteenth century. A critical concern then (as now) was how to 
punish effectively and yet avoid cruelty. A brief look at this history 
may help develop our own contemporary conception of penal 
cruelty, by allowing us to rediscover and reappreciate its moral and 
political roots. But the question of history’s import for contemporary 
law and policy is always fraught and requires some discussion before 
we can sensibly proceed. 
Lawyers and judges frequently look to the past in hopes of 
finding a map to the legal terrain presented by the case at hand. The 
search is for the original intent of law drafters and adopters. How did 
they, or might they, have understood certain legal texts? This kind of 
historical inquiry has been an important part of judicial decision-
making under the Eighth Amendment, and there is a significant 
scholarship concerning this form of historical inquiry into the 
Amendment as well.31 This is not my purpose here in looking to 
history, however. I do not attempt to discern the particular 
intellectual lineage of the federal prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments found in the Eighth Amendment as ratified in 1789 or 
similar provisions in state constitutions that date from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Instead, I look back for a 
more general sense of direction. 
To return to my map metaphor, maps (or if you prefer the latest 
technology, global positioning devices) are wonderful guides to well-
travelled territory. For more adventurous travel into new or foreign 
regions, however, one may need to rely on more general, directional 
guidance: navigation by stars or a compass or even an internal sense 
of direction. We may also try to figure the way ahead according to 
the path already taken, asking: Are we still headed in the same 
 
 31. See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The 
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969); William C. Heffernan, Constitutional 
Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 1355 (2005); Stinneford, supra note 30; Stinneford, supra note 5. 
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direction? We often use history to guide in this general sense, even in 
law. This is the historical direction I seek here; I believe it is a kind 
of direction particularly appropriate to deciding constitutional 
questions under cruel and unusual punishment because of the open-
ended nature of its text and the character of our federal constitution 
today.32 
This historical look may inform the “evolving standards of 
decency” standard used by the Court in Miller and many other 
Eighth Amendment cases in suggesting an evolutionary path, a 
direction.33 Deepening our understanding of cruelty in American 
history should also inform moral and political discussions of 
punishment that occur outside the courtroom and that may determine 
the shape of penal legislation and practice in the days to come. 
 A brief look at this history tells us that the American concern 
with cruelty in punishment goes deep. It has been part of our national 
fabric from the very beginning.34 
Initially we must set cruelty within an intellectual and 
ideological context, within the milieu of the thinkers which helped 
inspire the American Revolution. Historians of the American 
Revolution have long recognized its intellectual foundation in 
Enlightenment thought, particularly in that strand of thought that has 
been labeled republicanism.35 The label covers a variety of thinkers, 
from the Continent, Britain, and North America, dating back to the 
seventeenth century and continuing through the eighteenth. 
Republicanism stands for a heterogeneous set of ideas about the 
 
 32. For more closely argued versions of this jurisprudential approach to the Eighth 
Amendment, see Heffernan, supra note 31, and Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1279 (2007). 
 33. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). For a particularly careful defense of such a 
use of history, see Heffernan, supra note 31. 
 34. E.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), available at 
https://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib.html. Section 46 provided: “For bodilie punishments we 
allow amongst us none that are inhumane Barbarous or cruel.” Section 92 provided: “No man 
shall exercise any Tirrany or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usualie kept for 
man’s use.” See sources at notes 39–50 infra. 
 35. E.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); BERNARD BAILYN, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969); see also PETER GAY, THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 396–465 (1969) (analyzing 
the development of political thought in the Enlightenment). 
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possibilities of what we today call democracy and freedom, but what 
earlier thinkers were wont to call a republican form of government, 
and liberty for citizens. 
Republican thought was frequently character-focused in that it 
applied terms of individual moral vices and virtues to the way that 
the state treated its citizens. This stemmed in part from the moral 
philosophy of the age, which was itself significantly character-
focused.36 This was also a time in the Western world when the state 
was standardly associated with a person—the monarch—and the 
lines between the personal and public in law were less sharply drawn 
than today. 
Republican writers strove to distinguish the virtues of a 
republican people from the vices of tyrannical rule. A republican 
citizenry was reasonable and moderate in its passions; the tyrant was 
angry. The virtuous republic was moderate in response to threat and 
refrained from violence if at all possible. The tyrant was prone to 
extreme responses and great violence. Cruelty was a sign of the 
despotic and the tyrannical; it denominated exactly what a republican 
nation should eschew. 
Cruelty was frequently decried as a central vice of both the 
individual and the state.37 For example, complaints of cruelty against 
the English monarch and medieval laws can be found in the writings 
of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams respectively.38 Cruelty was a 
 
 36. E.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 520–21 (1739–40); ADAM SMITH, 
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, 1–5 (1759) (2011). See generally MICHAEL L. FRAZER, 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF SYMPATHY: JUSTICE AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND TODAY (2010) (distinguishing two lines of Enlightenment thought, 
between sentimentalists such as Hume and Smith who emphasized the moral importance of 
emotion, and rationalists such as Immanuel Kant who sought a purely rational basis for moral 
principles and conduct). 
 37. See MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Cruelty, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 
306, 306–18 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1965) (“Among other vices, I cruelly hate cruelty, both by 
nature and by judgment, as the extreme of all vices.”) Id. at 313. Hume also considered cruelty as 
the worst vice. Annette C. Baier, Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant, 103 
ETHICS 436, 436, 439 (1993). 
 38. Thomas Jefferson, in his first draft of the Declaration of Independence, accused King 
George III of cruelty with respect to slavery: “He has waged cruel war against human nature 
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who 
never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur 
miserable death in their transportation thither.” This charge did not survive into the final draft, 
however. JOHN GABRIEL HUNT, THE ESSENTIAL THOMAS JEFFERSON 27 (1994). 
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central part of the Enlightenment critique of nonrepublican 
punishments. Especially as practiced on the Continent, the use of 
physical torture in investigation was decried as cruel. So were the 
bodily mutilations, flagellations, and torturous executions that were 
employed as punishments on the Continent, in England and, to a 
lesser extent, its colonies.39 A great concern of penal reformers was 
the effect of public penal violence on citizens who witnessed it. 
Citizens could be corrupted by the brutality displayed at public 
hangings, floggings, and other punishments, just as tyrants were 
corrupted by their own unchecked exercise of brute power.40 
Cesare Beccaria, one of the most influential writers on criminal 
justice in the eighteenth century, warned that harsh punishments 
hardened the hearts of men, corrupting them: “To the degree that 
punishments become more cruel, men’s souls become hardened, just 
as fluids always seek the level of surrounding objects . . . .”41 
Another writer influential on both sides of the Atlantic, Baron de 
Montesquieu argued: “The severity of punishments is fitter for 
despotic governments, whose principle is terror, than for a monarch 
or a republic, whose spring is honor and virtue.”42 
Considerations of cruelty in punishment did not always focus on 
the character of the punisher or citizenry, however. Beccaria, 
Montesquieu, and others contended that cruelty was the result of 
 
  John Adams, in a pamphlet on religion and feudal law said, “Thus was human nature 
chained fast for ages in a cruel, shameful, and deplorable servitude to him and his subordinate 
tyrants, who, it was foretold, would exalt himself above all that was called God, and that was 
worshipped [sic].” JOHN ADAMS, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS 450 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bolles and Houghton 1851). 
 39. BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON 
CRIMINALS, AND UPON SOCIETY (1787). Rush was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a 
leading physician of his age, and an influential penal reformer. 
 40. “Capital punishment is not useful because of the example of cruelty which it gives to 
men. If the passions or the necessity of war have taught people to shed human blood, the laws that 
moderate men’s conduct ought not to augment the cruel example, which is all the more pernicious 
because judicial execution is carried out methodically and formally.” CESARE BECCARIA, ON 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 51 (David Young trans., 1986) (1764) See generally RUSH, supra 
note 39 (arguing that public corporal punishments increase crime due to their coarsening effect on 
public moral sensibilities). 
 41. BECCARIA, supra note 40, at 46. On the influence of Beccaria on the framers, see 
Stinneford, supra note 30, at 956–57. See also MARCELLO MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA AND 
THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM 125–43 (1973) (detailing the widespread impact of Beccaria’s 
treatise on criminal legislation reform throughout Europe and the United States). 
 42. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 81 
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1899) (1748). 
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excessive or unnecessary punishment. If severity of punishment 
could be made proportionate to severity of offense, then punishment 
would be inflicted only as necessary and cruelty could be avoided.43 
Eighteenth century penal reformers also targeted the physicality of 
traditional punishments as a source of cruelty. They believed that if 
punishment could address the mind or soul of the wrongdoer without 
attacking his body, this would represent a great advance. 
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, an explicitly 
Christian critique of cruel punishment emerged, with the obligation 
of Christian compassion toward offenders becoming a central theme 
for many penal reformers. Quakers in both England and America led 
this early effort in evangelical humanitarianism. John Howard’s 
heroic efforts at jail reforms in England directly inspired American 
thought on punishment following the American Revolution.44 A new 
organization, the Society for the Alleviation of the Miseries of 
Prisoners in Pennsylvania, spearheaded reform efforts in that state to 
reform punishment according to the Christian obligation of 
benevolence.45 
Benevolence toward all persons including criminal offenders 
was promoted as the positive virtue to defeat the vice of cruelty in 
punishment. As one Pennsylvania reformer wrote: “Every body 
acknowledges our obligations to universal benevolence. But these 
cannot be fulfilled, unless we love the whole human race, however 
diversified they may be by weakness or crimes.”46 
 
 43. See BECCARIA, supra note 40, at xvii. 
 44. See JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1777). 
 45. “When we consider that the obligations of benevolence, which are founded on the 
precepts and examples of the Author of Christianity, are not cancelled by the follies and crimes of 
our fellow Creatures: and when we reflect upon the miseries which penury, hunger, cold, 
unnecessary severity, unwholesome apartments and guilt (the usual attendants of Prisons) involve 
with them; it becomes us to extend our compassion to that part of Mankind, who are subjects of 
those miseries. By the aid of humanity, their undue and illegal Sufferings may be prevented, the 
links which should bind the whole family of mankind together, under all circumstances, be 
preserved unbroken: and such degrees and modes of punishment may be discovered and 
suggested as may, instead of continuing habits of vice, become the means of restoring our fellow 
Creatures to virtue and happiness.” PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ALLEVIATING THE MISERIES OF 
PUBLIC PRISONS, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ALLEVIATING THE 
MISERIES OF PUBLIC PRISONS 3–4 (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank 1806) (adopted May 8, 
1987). 
 46. RUSH, supra note 39, at 7. The closest contemporary term for benevolence as used by 
reformers is empathy or compassion. Hume saw benevolence as the key to moral conduct. See 
HUME, supra note 36, at 83–86 (Sec. VI “Of Benevolence and Anger”). 
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One of the first legislative tasks of the new American states 
following the Revolution was to create a set of criminal laws and 
punishments appropriate to the ideals of the new nation. These 
needed to be effective in controlling criminality, but not sanguinary 
(i.e., bloody); sufficient to keep order but not cruel. As one reformer 
put it, in language typical of the times:  
It was not to be expected, that people enamored of freedom 
and a Republic, should long acquiesce in a system of laws, 
many of them the product of barbarous usages, corrupt 
society, and monarchial punishments, and imperfectly 
adapted to a new country, simple manners, and a popular 
form of government.47  
Similarly, William Bradford, who served as the attorney general of 
Pennsylvania and later the second attorney general of the United 
States, wrote concerning criminal punishment in 1794: 
[O]n no subject has government, in different parts of the 
world, discovered more indolence and inattention than in 
the construction or reform of the penal code. Legislators 
feel themselves elevated above the commission of crimes 
which the laws proscribe, and they have too little personal 
interest in a system of punishments to be critically exact in 
restraining its severity. The degraded class of men, who are 
the victims of the laws, are thrown at a distance which 
obscures their sufferings and blunts the sensibility of the 
Legislator. Hence sanguinary punishments, contrived in 
despotic and barbarous ages, have been continued when the 
progress of freedom, science, and morals renders them 
unnecessary and mischievous: and laws, the offspring of a 
corrupted monarchy, are fostered in the bosom of a youthful 
republic.48 
Where did all this high-minded rhetoric about punishment lead? 
To the penitentiary. In a story well told elsewhere, the new American 
 
 47. THOMAS EDDY, AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE PRISON OR PENITENTIARY HOUSE IN THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK 9 (New York, Isaac Collins and Son 1801). 
 48. WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY HOW FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS 
NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1793), reprinted in 12 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 122, 127–28 (1968). At the time that he wrote this, Bradford sat on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. 
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states engaged in a series of penal experiments that ended in the 
creation of a new method of punishment, incarceration in a 
penitentiary.49 The penitentiary was a large-scale institution designed 
for the long-term, postconviction confinement of offenders to effect 
both their punishment and reform.50 The creation of the penitentiary 
was a celebrated achievement of the new American states, entailing 
the expenditure of great public sums, and often engendering great 
civic pride. These new institutions brought interested visitors from 
around the world, including Alexis de Tocqueville (who came 
ostensibly to see penitentiaries rather than democracy in action) and 
Charles Dickens.51 
Two rival penitentiary systems arose, the so-called separate 
system of Pennsylvania in which prisoners were effectively held in 
solitary confinement during the entirety of their incarceration, and 
the silent system of New York, in which prisoners labored in 
congregate during the day in complete silence and were housed in 
single cells at night.52 Reformers battled fiercely over the merits of 
each system both in achieving prisoner reform and avoiding penal 
cruelty.53 
Defenders of the Pennsylvania system decried the use of the 
whip in New York penitentiaries. Immediate application of the lash 
by guards was the means by which silence was enforced in New 
York penitentiaries. Others claimed that the solitary confinement of 
prisoners in the Pennsylvania model was far crueler in its effects on 
mind and spirit. Among those holding the latter view was the 
 
 49. The earliest penitentiaries were built and enthusiastically received in northern states. 
While most southern states eventually built penitentiaries as well, they came somewhat later and 
encountered greater skepticism than in the north. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND 
JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 34–72 (1984). 
 50. See ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN 
EARLY AMERICA (1992); DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE 
OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750–1850 (1978) (on the 
development of the penitentiary in England). 
 51. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (Herman R. Lantz ed., Francis Lieber 
trans., Southern Illinois University Press 1964) (1833); 1 CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 
FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION (London, Chapman and Hall 1842) (1987); WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 
REPORT ON THE PENITENTIARIES OF THE UNITED STATES (Patterson Smith 1969) (1835). 
 52. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 80 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 737–38 (1989). 
 53. Id. 
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novelist Charles Dickens, who wrote following a visit to the Eastern 
Penitentiary in Pennsylvania, the only institution operating on the 
separate model: “The system here, is rigid, strict, and hopeless 
solitary confinement. I believe it, in its effects, to be cruel and 
wrong.”54 
What can we take from this history? Again historiographic 
cautions must be offered. This has been not only a very brief history, 
but a selective rhetorical account of but one side of a multi-sided 
historical debate. I have exclusively considered the writings of penal 
reformers. Though influential in their day, they were certainly not 
always persuasive. For example, even in post-revolutionary 
Pennsylvania, where punishment reform efforts were strongest, the 
basic “sanguinary” punishment of English law, the death penalty, 
was retained. Public whipping was used as a punishment in many 
American states well into the nineteenth century. Always there were 
powerful countervailing forces supporting harsh punishments, 
whether in traditional or modern forms. These forces have left less of 
a written record, but that does not make them unimportant 
historically.55 
The full history of early American punishment is a complex 
story of many different persons, groups, and regions who, just as 
today, had bitter disagreements about the effectiveness and 
 
 54. DICKENS, supra note 51, at 238. The famous novelist observed of the Pennsylvania 
penitentiary: 
In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind, humane and meant for reformation; 
but I am persuaded that those who devised the system of Prison Discipline, and those 
benevolent gentlemen who carry it into execution, do not know what it is that they are 
doing. I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of 
torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon 
the sufferers; and in guessing at it myself, and in reasoning from what I have seen 
written upon their faces, and what to my certain knowledge they feel within, I am only 
the more convinced that there is a depth of terrible endurance in it which none but the 
sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man has a right to inflict upon his 
fellow creature. I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to 
be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body: and because its ghastly signs and 
tokens are not so palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; 
because its wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few cries that human ears 
can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a secret punishment which slumbering 
humanity is not roused up to stay. 
Id. at 238–39. 
 55. See Pillsbury, supra note 52, at 734–38; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77–82 (1993) (detailing the evolution of the penitentiary 
system). 
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justification of different methods of punishment. Given this, the brief 
ideological history of penal reformers given here can provide at most 
modest guidance in the resolution of contemporary penal 
controversies. What matters for our purposes are two main points. 
One. From the beginning of the nation, cruelty mattered. It was 
one of the central negative values of the new Republic, something to 
be avoided at great cost. The new nation would not be what it aimed 
to be, what it declared itself to be, if it employed cruel punishments. 
As the variation between state punishment practices in America in 
the early nineteenth century demonstrates, cruelty in punishment was 
then, as now, a contested term. It had different meanings for different 
persons and groups. Still, it mattered greatly whether a punishment 
could be judged cruel. In the Republican thought of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, cruelty was not an empty concept, not 
just a label to be placed on conclusions reached by other means but 
drew on a set of widely shared ideals. A shared understanding about 
the sort of person and state that acted in a cruel fashion provided 
moral guidance. 
This rhetorical discussion was an important part of the historical 
context for the inclusion of cruelty as a constitutional norm for 
punishment in both federal and state jurisdictions in the United 
States. It provides a historical basis for considering cruelty as a norm 
capable of producing a counter-majoritarian limit on the methods and 
extent of punishment in the United States. It also provides a sound 
historical foundation for cruelty as a norm important to any political 
discussion in America of what punishments are just. 
Two. Cruelty was frequently used as a term of character, 
focusing on the character of the punisher. The assessment of cruelty 
often rested on the punisher’s attitude toward the punished. At least 
for some reformers, the punisher should strive for a benevolent 
attitude toward the punished. This attitude did not preclude imposing 
significant punishment; indeed, for many it was consistent with the 
creation of a truly fearsome new institution of punishment. It did 
require concern for the punished as a person with basic individual 
value, however. 
Some will argue, and vigorously, that in constitutional law, 
history’s guidance is limited to the analysis of original intent, which 
here might mean ascertaining what punishments were considered 
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anathema by the Framers’ generation in the late eighteenth century in 
England and America.56 Rebutting this argument would require 
discussion extending far beyond the bounds of this Essay, and yet it 
is worth at least briefly considering how we treat other historically 
grounded basic American values in addressing contemporary 
problems. If elsewhere we take a more capacious view of history’s 
guidance and the growth of the American nation, that may provide 
partial support for doing so here as well. 
In the modern United States we celebrate a long-standing 
commitment to the values of freedom and equality dating back to our 
most important founding documents: the Declaration of 
Independence signed in 1776, the Constitution adopted by Congress 
in 1787, and the Bill of Rights ratified by the states in 1791. We 
celebrate these historic documents even as we must acknowledge 
their—from the contemporary perspective—truly breathtaking 
limitations on freedom and equality. Their drafters and signatories 
did not protect rights for slaves, the unpropertied, and women. 
Indeed the Constitution protected race slavery in the South.57 Still 
many Americans believe that both the Declaration of Independence 
and the original Constitution set out ideals of freedom and equality 
that should guide us today.58 
We might take the same view of cruelty in punishment. This 
also was an original American value set out in founding documents, 
the Bill of Rights in particular. The abhorrence of governmental 
cruelty also was part of the original national vision, representing a 
critical moral and political distinction from the philosophies and 
practices of monarchial England and Continental regimes. There is a 
historical path here, dating back to the eighteenth century, of 
critiquing punishment according to cruelty. This is a word that had 
 
 56. See supra note 33. 
 57. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (slaves counted as two-thirds of a person for purposes of 
representation in the House of Representatives; same for taxation); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 
(fugitive slave clause, providing for return of slaves escaping from slave states); U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9 (no ban on international slave trade until 1808). Among the most important provisions 
understood to protect slavery was Article V, which requires a three quarters majority of the states 
to approve any amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. V. This gave the slaveholding 
South an effective veto on constitutional amendments with respect to slavery. 
 58. For example, Abraham Lincoln saw the Declaration of Independence as a foundation for 
American values of freedom and union. GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS 
THAT REMADE AMERICA 130–33 (1992). 
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normative power for the generation that shaped the new republic. 
Even as its particular applications were hotly contested, its moral 
centrality was accepted. It provided general direction. Given this, 
why not take the norm of avoiding cruelty in punishment seriously 
today? I think we should. But if we do, what would that mean? To 
this question I now turn. 
IV.  TWO FORMS OF CRUELTY 
What do we mean, today, when we call a person or an action 
cruel? Here we turn from intellectual history to moral philosophy. 
We must employ basic tools of analytic philosophy to elucidate and 
articulate cruelty’s meaning as used in ordinary language. From this 
analysis we may glean a norm capable of application to many 
settings, including punishment. In essence, we seek to move from 
moral consensus to moral controversy, from examples of cruelty 
upon which all may agree and that therefore provide the outlines of 
norms generally agreed upon, to the application of those norms to 
controversies in contemporary criminal punishment. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines cruel as referring to 
persons who are “disposed to inflict suffering; indifferent to or taking 
pleasure in another’s pain or distress; destitute of kindness or 
compassion; merciless, pitiless, hardhearted.”59 Here we find the two 
basic forms of cruelty distinguished according to mental state: the 
sadistic and the callous.60 
The sadistic intentionally inflict great pain on others for their 
own pleasure or personal gain. Brutal and sustained attacks on the 
vulnerable—the torture of animals or children—represent core 
instances of such cruelty. The more common form of cruelty is that 
of indifference: callous disregard for the suffering of others. A 
person who drives at high speed on a narrow street lined with 
pedestrians while texting on a cell phone, acts with indifference to 
the danger her conduct poses to all nearby. 
 
 59. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 78 (2d ed. 1989). 
 60. Here and in the discussion that follows I have been influenced by John Kekes’s analysis 
of cruelty. John Kekes, Cruelty and Liberalism, 106 ETHICS 834 (1996). Kekes defines cruelty as: 
“the disposition of human agents to take delight in or be indifferent to the serious and unjustified 
suffering their actions caused to their victims.” Id. at 838; see also JEREMY WALDRON, TERROR, 
TORTURE AND TRADEOFFS 292–301 (2010) (taking an ordinary language approach to the 
definition of cruelty). 
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Cruelty normally involves severe suffering. In many instances of 
cruelty, the harm suffered is life-threatening. This may be true in a 
physical sense, but it may also be true because the harm suffered by 
the victim damages and endangers basic mental and emotional well-
being. In all cases, certainly all cases relevant to punishment, the hurt 
must go deep to be cruel. 
Cruelty is an emotion term in that it describes the emotionality 
of the cruel person. It is marked by the presence or absence of certain 
morally significant emotions: either pleasure at another’s suffering or 
a radical lack of concern for—a blameworthy hardheartedness in the 
face of—another’s suffering. The emotional dimension of cruelty 
explains why cruelty is often seen as a personal norm. We experience 
emotions according to what matters to us personally. The delight 
(positive emotion) or coldness (lack of emotion) of cruelty reveals 
what matters and does not to the person labeled cruel with regard to 
another person’s suffering. 
Cruelty involves a significant devaluation of the suffering 
person. That is, the person labeled cruel views the sufferer as less 
than a fully valuable human being. In the most extreme examples, 
the cruel person sees the sufferer as having no moral value. The 
sufferer’s pain does not matter because the person suffering does not 
matter. The cruel person may seek and enjoy the other’s suffering 
(sadism). Or, she may distance herself completely from that suffering 
(indifference). Either way, the pain of the sufferer prompts no moral 
concern, gives no cause for remorse or restraint. 
Many cases of cruelty rest on a less obvious form of 
devaluation. Instead of completely rejecting the other’s value, the 
other is valued in a very limited fashion. The other is treated as a 
lesser type of human being. The other, the one who suffers, is not 
seen as a unique person with his or her own unique strengths and 
weaknesses, fears and desires, but instead becomes a projection of 
the other’s judgments. This radical restriction of view represents a 
blameworthy devaluation of person. Slavery in the United States 
provides a particularly stark illustration. 
In the antebellum South, white slave owners commonly, and 
often sincerely, touted their concern for their black slaves, even 
TALKING ABOUT CRUELTY 9/7/2014  11:46 AM 
906 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:885 
 
arguing that slavery benefited the slave.61 White slaveholders valued 
blacks for who they (owners and other whites) saw them as being. 
The dark-skinned had value in white eyes, and even sometimes a 
value beyond property worth, but it was a value distinct from that of 
white persons.62 There had to be a value distinction between the 
races to justify race slavery. 
Today we judge racial slavery—the ownership of another person 
and their offspring by virtue of racial descent—as the height of 
cruelty. We judge it cruel because we see the profound devaluation 
of the slave inherent in the condition of slavery. We see the deep 
suffering that slavery’s denial of autonomy involves, even if the 
slave receives adequate food and shelter. We see the full person held 
in captivity, a sentient being that the slaveholder saw only partially, 
because the slaveholder saw only a member of a different race, or 
even species. We see the cruelty inherent in the slave owner’s 
radically narrowed view of the slave’s humanity. 
Finally, the judgment of cruelty rests on an assessment of 
responsibility that comes out of the moral relationship between two 
or more persons: one who suffers and the other who is responsible 
for that suffering. Cruelty involves a judgment that the cruel person 
disregarded fundamental moral obligations that arose because of his 
or her relationship with the victim. 
Where one person causes another great suffering, that conduct 
should give rise to an obligation to minimize or alleviate that 
suffering if possible. There is at least an obligation of concern for the 
suffering person. Someone who is cruel rejects basic moral 
obligations that we think a harm doer should have for his or her 
victim. In its sadistic form, cruelty describes a morally perverted 
relationship in which causing another pain is seen as a positive good. 
Cruelty can also involve the refusal to recognize moral obligations 
where we believe such obligations should exist by virtue of the 
 
 61. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE & ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, FATAL SELF-DECEPTION: 
SLAVEHOLDING PATERNALISM IN THE OLD SOUTH (2011); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD 
THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE: TWO ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION (1988); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, 
ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976). 
 62. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Laws, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Univ. of N.C. 
Press 1954) (1787) (detailing Jefferson’s view of distinctions between the white, black, and 
Indian races). 
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consequences of one’s actions or inaction. This is cruelty by 
indifference. 
Most controversies over cruelty involve its responsibility aspect, 
or more precisely, the requirement of culpability for the other’s 
suffering. We must for example distinguish between cases where the 
one causing pain is culpably indifferent to the victim’s suffering and 
those where causing pain is consistent with concern. A doctor who 
performs an excruciatingly painful procedure on a patient will not be 
judged indifferent to the patient’s suffering if the procedure is 
medically necessary. The patient’s pain matters to the doctor (we 
hope); it is not the most important consideration in this circumstance, 
however. A parent punishing a child might present a similar example 
of causing pain with concern, not out of sadism or with 
indifference.63 By contrast, causing damage sufficient to threaten 
another’s life in some fundamental respect, without any moral 
justification and without any experience of concern, shows that the 
sufferer does not matter to the person causing the harm, and therefore 
that person may be called cruel. 
V.  CRUELTY AND PUNISHMENT: A QUESTION OF INDIFFERENCE 
Now we are ready to apply the cruelty norm to punishment. The 
Miller question can be reframed: Is mandatory life without parole for 
a juvenile murderer a cruel punishment according to the general 
norms of cruelty? The three critical questions to ask are: (1) whether 
this punishment entails sufficient suffering such that its imposition 
might be cruel, (2) whether the state may be held responsible, that is, 
may be blamed for that suffering, and as part of that analysis, (3) 
whether the punishment decision involves a devaluation of the 
offender’s value as a person by the decision-maker. 
We begin with the prerequisite that cruelty involves a person or 
group experiencing serious suffering, meaning harm that threatens 
either physical life or the mental and emotional capacities necessary 
 
 63. Both of these examples—the medical and parental infliction of pain for the good of the 
sufferer—are useful to illustrate culpable indifference, but less so for illustrating cruelty, because 
we generally presume that the pain inflicted in such cases will be moderate. Cruelty requires more 
significant suffering. If doctor- or parent-inflicted pain is severe enough to reach potentially cruel 
levels, then we are likely to re-examine the judgment that it was inflicted with concern as opposed 
to indifference. 
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for a decent life. Life-long incarceration involves such suffering. It is 
meant to—and does—inflict profound pain. Putting aside the 
physical pain that may be an (at least officially) unintended part of 
incarceration,64 we see that incarceration is intended to deprive the 
individual of liberty and to remove the person from close personal 
relationships. By design in the United States, it precludes or strains 
close bonds between those outside and those inside.65 Incarceration 
severely restricts the prisoner’s opportunity for work, for growth, and 
for relationship. 
Incarceration harms marriages and families. It separates children 
and parents, making those relationships difficult. It can lead to 
institutionalization, the inability to live outside of a prison 
environment. With some frequency, the stress of imprisonment 
causes or exacerbates mental illness. It can inspire deep despair, 
leading to suicide. In some settings, incarceration leads to 
violentization in which all relations are shaped by the threat of 
violence. A sentence of LWOP easily meets the suffering element of 
cruelty. It is meant to cause extreme suffering. 
As the Miller Court recognized, life without chance of parole 
entails greater suffering for juvenile offenders than for adult 
offenders.66 Young prisoners are more likely to be raped in prison 
than other inmates.67 Proportionately, juvenile offenders given life 
sentences spend more of their lives in prison than others serving life 
terms.68 Most profoundly, for a young person, life imprisonment can 
 
 64. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 853–54 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing 
cases of brutality in prisons and jails); Dolovich, supra note 5. For a report on brutality in the Los 
Angeles County jails, see CITIZENS’ COMM’N ON JAIL VIOLENCE, REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ 
COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE (2012), available at http://ccjv.lacounty.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/CCJV-Report.pdf. 
 65. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). 
 66. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2028 (2010). 
 67. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AGAINST ALL ODDS: PRISON CONDITIONS FOR YOUTH 
OFFENDERS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES 14–18 (2012), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0112ForUpload_1.pdf. A concern 
with rape was not cited by the Court in Miller. 
 68. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
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arrest personal development, freezing him or her in an immature 
state.69 
A cruelty judgment also requires moral responsibility, the 
determination that a person or entity is responsible for the other’s 
suffering. It requires blame. This is the critical normative question 
for punishment. Obviously the state causes much of the prisoner’s 
pain. Loss of liberty and the suffering that entails is explicitly 
envisioned by statute, ordered by a court, and funded by the people 
of the jurisdiction. Yes, the offender’s decision to commit the crime 
triggers conviction and punishment. Yes, we can say: do the crime, 
and you must do the time. The connection between crime and 
punishment remains human-made, however. No punishment is 
automatic upon crime commission unless we the people decide it 
must be.70 
By itself, causation does not establish responsibility, however. 
Severe punishment may be justified. Punishment can only be cruel if 
the state can properly be blamed for the suffering of juveniles 
serving mandatory life terms for murder. This judgment seems to 
require a comparison of the severity of punishment with the extent of 
the offender’s desert or dangerousness (or both) according to basic 
punishment principles. But this assessment involves many 
difficulties. 
To resolve the proper severity of punishment according to 
principles of punishment, we must first choose a punishment theory, 
 
 69. See Robert Johnson & Sonia Tabriz, Death by Incarceration as a Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment When Applied to Juveniles: Extending Roper to Life Without Parole, Our Other 
Death Penalty, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241, 251–52 (2009). 
 70. For an example of the way that responsibility can be shifted from punisher to the 
punished by an emphasis on the latter’s choices, see the explanation that the trial court gave for 
imposing a life without chance of parole sentence on Terrance Graham, a sentence far greater 
than that requested by the prosecution or recommended by the State Department of Corrections. 
The sentencing court told Graham, in part: 
And I don’t understand why you would be given such a great opportunity to do 
something with your life and why you would throw it away. The only thing that I can 
rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going to lead your life and that 
there is nothing that we can do for you. . . . We can’t do anything to deter you. This is 
the way you are going to lead your life, and I don’t know why you are going to. . . . I 
have no idea. . . . Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to 
the Court that you have decided that this is the way you are going to live your life and 
that the only thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from your actions. 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020. 
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selecting most basically between retribution and deterrence.71 
Scholars have long debated the merits of each, but just because each 
theory has substantial public and expert support, courts are reluctant 
to choose between them. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a court making 
an explicit constitutional choice between the two.72 
Even if such a choice could be made, there are difficult 
questions to resolve about the particular form and application of each 
theory. For example, within deterrence, how should the value of 
specific deterrence—the need to prevent further criminality by the 
particular offender—be weighed against the value of general 
deterrence—the need to deter other persons from similar 
wrongdoing? Are there circumstances in which an offender who 
poses little or no danger of reoffending may nevertheless be 
imprisoned because of the need to make an example for others? With 
retribution, there are equally important questions to resolve, 
including whether deserved punishment should rest exclusively on 
the crime of conviction or also include an assessment of the 
offender’s character, meaning his or her general disposition to 
wrongdoing.73 And if both offense and character are considered in 
evaluating deserved punishment, how should they be weighed 
against each other? 
Another set of complications comes from the considerable 
variation between cases. Even within an offense category such as 
first-degree murder, there can be significant differences in individual 
culpability and evident dangerousness. Witness the differences 
between the two defendants whose appeals were jointly resolved in 
 
 71. This is an oversimplified view of punishment’s justifications, of course. It does not 
address mixed theories, which seek to use aspects of both deterrence and retribution, expressive 
theories, or restorative justice approaches. Nevertheless it should be sufficient for purposes of this 
discussion to identify the most common and basic division between punishment theories here: 
retribution and deterrence. 
 72. E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any 
one penological theory.”); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465–68; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30; 
Ryan, supra note 5, at 102 n.116 (citing cases); Stinneford, supra note 30, at 924 n.104. Some 
have argued that retribution nevertheless should provide the core guidance for determinations of 
disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Stinneford, supra note 30, at 
962–68; see also Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 
1756 (2012) (seeing retribution as driving recent Supreme Court decisions). 
 73. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, PUNISHMENT AND THE MORAL EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW, 
MORALITY, AND RELIGION (2012). 
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Miller. Kuntrell Jackson was convicted as an accomplice to a 
robbery that ended up as a murder. He did not participate in the act 
of killing or demonstrate any purpose to kill. Proof of the required 
mens rea for his form of capital murder (felony murder based on his 
role as an accomplice to a robbery that caused death) depended on 
his utterance of a single sentence that no witness at trial testified to 
hearing, but which was recorded in statements to police taken prior 
to trial.74 Evan Miller, by contrast, was the perpetrator of a brutal 
killing by bludgeoning and fire, in which he demonstrated clear 
purpose to kill in both word and deed.75 
Given the difficulty of these questions, it is not surprising that 
the Court has not set out a singular justification for severe 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Court has instead 
employed a multifactor analysis drawing from different theories of 
punishment to set the outer boundaries of permissible punishment. 
From a criminal law scholar’s point of view, the resulting analysis 
may lack analytic rigor and coherence, but considering the Court’s 
constitutional role here, which is to set the outer bounds of 
punishment while permitting maximum latitude for jurisdictions to 
determine most punishment questions for themselves, this approach 
seems nearly inevitable. At least it seems inevitable if we frame the 
question as one of justified punishment according to punishment 
theory. But what if we evaluated punishment according to the norm 
of cruelty? 
Instead of relying on punishment principles to supply a 
constitutional norm, we might use the norm of cruelty to assess the 
punisher’s moral-emotive attitude toward the punished. We might 
ask: Is there anything in the punishment decision process that is 
likely to foster culpable indifference toward the offender’s penal 
suffering? Is there anything in current punishment law or penal 
 
 74. The evidence indicated that Jackson either said, “I thought you all was playin’,” a 
statement presumably directed at his two companions, voicing Jackson’s disquiet at the violent 
threats that had been made, or “[w]e ain’t playin’,” a statement directed at the robbery victim, 
which would represent a threat to the store clerk, that she should comply with the robbery 
demand. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. The “we ain’t playin’” statement was attributed to Jackson by 
another participant in the robbery, Travis Booker, when he was questioned by police after the 
crime. At trial, Booker testified differently, stating that Jackson had actually said: “I thought you 
all was playin’.” At trial Jackson also testified to making this latter statement. Jackson v. State, 
194 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004). 
 75. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
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process that encourages indifference to the value of the offender? Is 
there anything in substantive law or procedure that radically restricts 
the decision-maker’s view of the offender as a person? The 
mandatory imposition of life sentences represents just such a 
restriction. It mandates indifference to the unique value of the 
offender as a person. 
VI.  CRUELTY AND MANDATORY 
LWOP FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Mandatory punishments have great popular appeal, especially 
for serious crimes. As the popular slogan goes: do the crime, and you 
do the time. With mandatory penalties, the link between crime and 
consequence appears unbreakable. If you want to avoid the 
consequence, just refrain from the crime. After the fact, once the 
crime is committed, there is no place for argument or negotiation, no 
listening to pleas for mercy or presentations in mitigation. The crime 
determines the punishment, all according to law. If we want the 
criminal law to send a clear and certain message condemning 
criminal violence—and of course we do—what could be better than 
this? Clear, simple, and emotionally powerful, this argument for 
mandatory punishments carries great political force. It does not make 
for good law, however. In practice, severe mandatory penalties 
violate basic precepts of due process. 
Mandatory punishments effectively convert voters and 
legislators into sentencers. Without knowing the names or identities 
of those to be sentenced, the particulars of the crimes or the 
offender’s individual involvement, legislators effectively sentence 
the as-yet uncharged. Judges become little more than legal 
functionaries at the sentencing proceeding, required to sentence 
according to statutory mandate regardless of case circumstances.76 
This is by design.77 
 
 76. Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135, 141 (2001) (“The 
venerable ritual of sentencing has become a puppet show where defendants are not individuals 
but criminal classes and judges’ discretion is hamstrung by generic legislative decrees.”); see also 
KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS (1998) (discussing how mandatory sentencing laws have failed to cure inequities in 
punishment). 
 77. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes 
Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 494–96 (2002) [hereinafter Emotive Due Process]; Samuel H. 
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This approach is partly motivated by distrust of the judiciary. 
Some members of the public believe that judges, if permitted 
discretion, will be soft on offenders at sentencing.78 Trends in 
judicial sentencing over the last generation provide little support for 
this concern, however, at least as compared with historical 
sentencing patterns.79 There is a related and more deep-rooted reason 
for the abandonment of discretion, though. It is simply the desire to 
ensure harsh punishment, regardless. Mandatory penalties effectively 
play on certain traits of human nature to increase penal severity. 
Determining punishment in the abstract maximizes the human 
impulse for severe punishment of violent crime. And it renders 
ineffective the most important force for lesser punishment: empathy 
for the punished. 
When we contemplate crimes in the abstract, we naturally 
imagine the worst offenses by the worst offenders.80 Thus when we 
set punishments in the abstract, we set them at a very high level. This 
is not problematic if decision-makers have discretion to impose 
lesser punishments based on the particulars of offense and offender. 
It is a serious problem if the penalty set in the abstract is mandatory 
in application. 
Sentencing in the abstract may be particularly affected by 
unconscious (or for some, conscious) bias with respect to race and 
 
Pillsbury, Learning from Forgiveness, 28 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 135 (2009) [hereinafter 
Learning from Forgiveness]. 
 78. See Emotive Due Process, supra note 77, at 516. The tendency to go to extremes in 
punishment has been long recognized. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 401 (J. Bowring ed., 1843). 
 79. Commitments to prison increased dramatically in California, in 1980–1990, even faster 
than the national increase in incarceration that occurred during this same period. FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON G. HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY IN 
CALIFORNIA 7–10, 14–15 (1992). The legislation that comprised the state’s Three Strikes law, its 
single most important modern mandatory minimum sentencing law, was signed into law in early 
1994, then put into the California constitution by approval in a voter proposition that fall. See JOE 
DOMANICK, CRUEL JUSTICE: THREE STRIKES AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME IN AMERICA’S 
GOLDEN STATE 123–41 (2004). 
 80. Social science research has documented a consistent disparity between opinions about 
sentences for crimes described in the abstract and particular instances of those crimes. The former 
are set higher than the latter. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS, Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal 
Justice, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1982); 
Michelle D. St Amand & Edward Zamble, Impact of Information About Sentencing Decisions on 
Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 515 (2001); see 
also Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 750–52 (2005) (discussing 
media impact on public views of criminal justice). 
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class. The assumption of mandatory sentencers, meaning voters or 
legislators, is that the worst crimes are committed by the worst 
people. For many, this conjures up individuals who are at the bottom 
of the social and economic hierarchy, who are likely to be the most 
depraved and the most dangerous. In recent years we have 
accumulated a great deal of data concerning race bias in punishment, 
especially in the death penalty, but also including the treatment of 
juvenile offenders.81 Disparities according to race appear significant 
throughout the juvenile justice system. And while mandatory 
penalties seem to provide a race-neutral basis for decision, they 
actually may exacerbate preexisting biases through a variety of 
mechanisms.82 
Even putting aside race and other group biases, we know as a 
matter of human nature that it is far easier to condemn persons at a 
distance than face-to-face. On the Internet, ordinary people hurl 
extraordinary verbal vitriol at others they have never met, using 
words they would never speak to another person in person. It is easy 
to malign faceless strangers. The converse is also true. It can be hard 
to condemn those we encounter face-to-face. In death penalty cases, 
lawyers know that success at the penalty phase requires humanizing 
the defendant, presenting him or her as a person who has suffered in 
the past. Jurors who otherwise would impose the death penalty based 
entirely on the crime may be swayed by the particulars of a 
defendant’s upbringing, particularly incidents of child abuse.83 
 
 81. For an overview of the literature, see DARNELL F. HAWKINS & KIMBERLY KEMPF-
LEONARD, OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2005); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: 
Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 683–87 
(2002). See also Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice: 
Disproportionate Minority Contact After Nearly 20 Years of Reform Efforts, 5 YOUTH VIOL. & 
JUV. JUST. 71 (2007) [hereinafter Minority Youths] (addressing the disproportionate number of 
minorities in the juvenile justice system); Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, 
Understanding the Antecedents of the “School-to-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between Race and 
School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633 (2011) (analyzing link between African-
American involvement in criminal justice and racial bias in school discipline). 
 82. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE, THEY’LL SEND ME HOME: YOUTH 
SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, 1, 24–29 (2008) (documenting racial 
disparities in California LWOP sentences). For current statistics and an introduction to the 
complexities of race disparity and discrimination in juvenile justice, see Minority Youths, supra 
note 81. 
 83. See SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH 
PENALTY 140–44 (2005). 
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These basic observations about human judgment remind us of 
the importance of intuition in penal assessment. We see here how our 
intuitive reactions may be affected by personal encounter or by its 
limitation. Our moral judgments largely rest on intuition, which 
reason then rationalizes or perhaps modifies.84 The physical presence 
of the one who is to be judged can affect intuitive judgment, because 
such presence can provoke empathy. Learning another’s life history, 
especially if it involves significant suffering, and witnessing the 
concern of others for this person can change an observer’s emotional 
response to the person. In short, the greatest check on our urge to 
punish severely is empathy for the offender, the feeling of sympathy 
we may have for the unique human being who will suffer that 
punishment. 
In psychological terms, mandatory punishments operate to bar 
the influence, and even the experience, of empathy for the offender. 
With mandatory punishments, there is no point to full presentation of 
mitigation evidence because it cannot affect the legal sentence. If 
mitigation evidence is presented, the legal (but not true) sentencer, 
the judge, will not likely pay close attention because to do so would 
just make her or his task potentially more difficult emotionally. The 
court must still do as the law commands, regardless. 
Understanding this, we see that mandatory sentences operate to 
deprive defendants of due process at sentencing even more 
effectively than would a rule that bars defense attorneys from 
sentencing hearings. Mandatory penalties deprive defendants of any 
meaningful opportunity to contest severe punishment by blocking the 
most effective of all moral appeals—the appeal to decision-maker 
empathy. 
The individualized sentencing requirement in capital cases rests 
on just this understanding of empathy’s moral importance. In a series 
of cases, the Court held that defendants in capital cases must have 
the opportunity to present themselves to sentencers as unique persons 
and not just as perpetrators of a particular category of offense. In 
capital cases, defendants must be permitted to make any mitigation 
argument that might persuade the decision-maker to spare the 
 
 84. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012). 
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defendant’s life. In other words, the defendant has a constitutional 
right to appeal to sentencer empathy. No wonder the Court in Miller 
found these cases apposite to mandatory juvenile life without parole. 
The Court has also recognized the legitimacy of appeals to 
empathy in another of its important late-twentieth-century Eighth 
Amendment decisions, Payne v. Tennessee,85 on victim impact 
statements. Reversing an earlier decision, the Court in Payne held 
that victim impact statements are constitutional in capital cases.86 
The Court decided that presentations designed to reveal the 
uniqueness of victims and appeal to decision-maker empathy for 
victims could play an important role in the punishment decision 
process.87 With victim impact statements, the appeal to empathy 
favors the prosecution, not the defense, but the principle that 
empathy is relevant to moral judgment is the same.88 
In summary, severe mandatory penalties like life without parole 
for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder should be struck down 
because they are based on a radically narrowed view of the value of 
the punished and preclude effective appeals to sentencer empathy on 
their behalf. Such laws treat individual defendants as legal categories 
and not unique persons. This constitutes culpable indifference to 
their value as persons.89 Thus, I think that the Miller decision is 
compelled by cruelty analysis. Mandatory life without chance of 
parole sentences for juvenile offenders are cruel. 
Okay. But Miller is now precedent. What next? The important 
question now becomes whether sentences of life in prison for 
 
 85. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 86. Id. at 827. 
 87. See id. 
 88. I do not here address the many significant objections that have been made to the use of 
victim impact statements at sentencing, especially in capital cases. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, 
Narrative and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Susan Bandes, Victims, 
‘Closure,’ and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Speeding in Reverse: An Anecdotal View of Why Victim Impact Testimony Should Not 
Be Driving Capital Prosecutions, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 555 (2003). Those issues lie beyond the 
scope of this essay. My point here is just to note that empathy for victims may connect us to 
important moral values relevant to our response to violent crime, just as empathy for defendants 
may. In neither instance does the appeal to or experience of empathy guarantee just decision-
making, however. For related issues, see the discussion of cruelty of murder, infra Part VII. 
 89. Mandatory punishments also subvert personal responsibility for punishment by ensuring 
that no one person or group feels personally responsible for taking a particular person’s freedom. 
See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332–34 (1985); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of 
Punishment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 545 (1996). 
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juveniles are constitutional if ordered by a court that had discretion 
to order a lesser sentence. Both the majority and dissenters in Miller 
clearly looked ahead to this question in their opinions.90 What does 
cruelty analysis say here? Are such sentences cruel? How might we 
tell? To answer these questions, we must return to a matter raised in 
the introduction but not mentioned since: the cruelty of murder itself. 
We cannot assess the limits of constitutional punishment for murder 
unless we take seriously the need for punishment to condemn 
murder’s cruelty. 
VII.  THE CRUELTY OF MURDER: 
A SOCIAL-MORAL JUDGMENT 
“That Miller deserved severe punishment for killing Cole 
Cannon is beyond question,” Justice Kagan declared in Miller.91 But 
why? If juveniles are fundamentally different from adults in terms of 
their culpability because of their state of social and brain 
development, then how can a fourteen-year-old like Miller be 
sufficiently culpable to deserve severe punishment? Why shouldn’t 
incarceration be limited to Miller’s youthful years since both 
biologic and social science suggest that he will become a different 
person on reaching adulthood? 
This is, of course, a rhetorical question. The Court never 
intimated in Miller or Graham or Roper that it would take the brain 
development argument this far. Instead it serves as but one factor, 
albeit an important one, in limiting the extremes of juvenile 
punishment. As the Court’s dissenting Justices have noted, however, 
the lesser culpability for youth argument based on brain development 
does not have a clear stopping place with respect to juvenile 
punishment.92 In fact the check on this argument for leniency comes 
 
 90. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“But given all we have said in Roper, 
Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty 
will be uncommon.”). This dicta attracted the critique of the dissenters. Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 
 92. See id. at 2481–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In fact, it is hard to see how this argument 
might be limited to juveniles, as brain development generally becomes complete at twenty-five, 
not eighteen. And, given the great variation in individual development rates and the fact that 
development is often delayed by acute or chronic trauma, which is suffered by many juvenile 
offenders, the argument, if accepted, might even apply to offenders older than twenty-five. 
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not from an examination of the juvenile’s choice-making capacity, 
but from assessment of the criminal wrong done by the juvenile. It 
comes from the social and moral facts of the crime committed. It 
comes from our collective need to condemn acts of murder through 
lawful punishment. As a result, our punishment inquiry must shift 
focus from offender to offense. 
In order to decide the limits of punishment in particular cases, 
we must assess cruelty with respect to both crime and its punishment. 
With this in mind, we consider the facts of the cases before the Court 
in Miller, in particular the prosecution’s case against Evan Miller; he 
was the one who the majority stated clearly deserved severe 
punishment.93 
Late one night in 2003, Evan Miller, fourteen, decided with a 
sixteen-year-old friend, Colby Smith, to rob or steal from a fifty-two-
year-old neighbor, Cole Cannon, who had come to the Miller trailer 
home late at night.94 Cannon came over in hopes of food—he had 
burned his own dinner—and to buy drugs from Miller’s mother.95 
Miller and Smith later accompanied Cannon back to Cannon’s trailer 
where they all smoked marijuana and drank.96 Cannon appeared to 
pass out. Miller removed Cannon’s wallet from his pocket and took 
$300 cash, which he split with Smith.97 Miller tried to put the wallet 
back in Cannon’s pocket. Cannon awoke, and a struggle ensued.98 
 
 93. The case of Kuntrell Jackson presents different considerations because of his minimal 
involvement in the robbery that was the predicate for his felony murder charge. In his 
concurrence in the case, Justice Breyer argued that no life without chance of parole sentence for 
Jackson could stand without a finding that he either acted with intent to kill or personally 
committed the act of killing. Id. at 2475–77 (Breyer, J., concurring). The facts before the Court 
indicated neither. 
 94. Id. at 2462 (majority opinion). The account in text is drawn from the Court opinion and 
the briefs of both Petitioner Miller and Respondent State of Alabama before the Court. Much of 
the evidence against Miller came from the testimony of codefendant Smith, who testified for the 
State, in exchange for which he was allowed to plead guilty to felony murder and received a life 
sentence with parole eligibility. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 
10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568, at *7. This pattern, in which an older codefendant receives a lighter 
sentence due to cooperation with authorities, is found in many cases in which juveniles receive an 
LWOP sentence. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 82, at 35–37. 
 95. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 
10-9646), 2012 WL 837389, at *3; Brief for Respondent at 6, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-
9646), 2012 WL 588454, at *6. 
 96. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Cannon grabbed Miller by the throat. Smith then hit Cannon once 
with a baseball bat, which resulted in Cannon losing his grip on 
Miller.99 Miller then took up the bat and repeatedly hit Cannon in the 
head with it. Miller covered Cannon’s head with a sheet and 
delivered a final blow, stating: “I am God, I’ve come to take your 
life.”100 The boys left the scene but later returned to set several fires 
in Cannon’s trailer in an effort to conceal their prior deeds. As this 
occurred, Cannon asked Colby Smith, “[W]hy are y’all doing this to 
me?”101 Cannon died of injuries from the baseball bat attack and 
smoke inhalation.102 
According to the basic culpability analysis of criminal law, 
which assesses the defendant’s reasons for action, Miller was highly 
culpable. Miller’s effort to kill Cannon was purposeful; Miller’s 
words and deeds indicated that he sought to end Cannon’s life 
without moral or legal justification. There is no indication that 
Cannon had done anything to harm or threaten Miller or a loved one 
prior to the incident. The theft that precipitated the killing appears to 
have been planned. While the attack that led to fatal violence was not 
premeditated,103 having begun when Cannon grabbed Miller by the 
throat, Miller’s subsequent, repeated blows with a baseball bat 
delivered on an apparently helpless Cannon and his participation in 
the arson of the trailer to cover up his crime, even while Cannon still 
lived, shows great indifference to the value of Cannon as a human 
being. 
Other homicide offenders will rank higher on a scale of relative 
culpability, however. As noted, the original baseball bat attack on 
Cannon was not planned. The episode only became violent when 
Cannon, a much older man, grabbed Miller by the neck. Miller was 
severely intoxicated at the time of the violence, which must have 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 
5322568, at *6. 
 102. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 103. This analysis assumes, consistent with the law of most American jurisdictions, that 
premeditation reliably indicates greater culpability. For questions about the premeditation-
culpability connection, see SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF 
MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 98–124 (1998). 
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affected his cognitive abilities, emotions, and moral sensibilities.104 
And he was only fourteen years old. 
So where does this leave us? Although Miller’s was by no 
means the worst murder imaginable, I suspect that after considering 
all the facts, most Americans would agree with Justice Kagan that 
because of his brutal actions, their lack of justification, and their fatal 
consequence, Evan Miller merits serious punishment. 
It is important to remember here that though this penal judgment 
can be rationalized—as I have just done here in summary fashion—
for most people this judgment will be based on intuition. Many will 
experience repugnance and even fear on hearing these facts. Seeing 
what he did, Miller will strike many as brutal and dangerous. Or to 
use the language I have favored here, many will conclude that 
Miller’s acts were cruel and that the law should condemn their 
cruelty with a significant sentence. How long a sentence becomes the 
critical question. Life without chance of parole? For that 
determination we must look at the person and life of Evan Miller 
beyond the acts for which he was convicted. 
But before we attempt any holistic judgment of both person and 
offense, we need to be clear about why the basic facts of the crime 
have independent significance. We need to understand why the 
cruelty of the crime, based on mens rea culpability (reasons for 
action) matters in ways independent of the offender’s state of 
personal development or personal history. 
In the United States, punishment for serious crime is a drama 
that must play to multiple audiences. Most fundamentally, it 
responds to an individual’s choices to harm others in violation of 
criminal law; it makes clear to the offender the wrongness of his or 
her conduct. Punishment also addresses community needs, declaring 
the extent of wrong done to those most directly affected, as well as 
the harms suffered by society at large. In this respect, punishment 
does important social-moral work, reaffirming fundamental 
 
 104. Miller, who was only fourteen, had consumed nearly a fifth of whisky that night, smoked 
marijuana, and had taken two Klonopin pills. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322568, at *6. Klonopin is a prescription medicine used to 
treat seizure disorders and anxiety. Among its known effects is heightening the intoxicating 
effects of alcohol. See Klonopin, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/klonopin.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013); Clonazepam, PUBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pubmedhealth/PMHT0009677/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
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principles and rules for the community by condemning their 
violation through penal sanction. The nature and extent of 
punishment serves as an indication of the social-moral meaning of 
the crime (its wrongness) to the community. 
This social meaning work helps explain why the criminal law 
sets such strict limits on the relevance of psychological causes and 
explanations in assessing liability. Criminal law judges a defendant’s 
chosen actions according to the reasons for which they were chosen, 
rather than the psychological origins of the defendant’s behavior, 
because reasons for action help determine the crime’s meaning to the 
community. Accidental and intentional harms signify different 
threats, different challenges to a community, even when the harm 
done is identical. The acts of the intentional killer and a driver with a 
blood-alcohol level just over the legal limit who causes a fatal 
accident through criminal negligence produce the same result: a 
person dies. Yet we distinguish this conduct in law and morality 
according to the reasons for which each “killer” acted. These reasons 
distinguish the actors in their relationships with the community. The 
intentional killer’s purpose to kill makes him or her appear a more 
deliberate wrongdoer, one who rejects the community’s most basic 
prohibition. This person therefore appears a more serious threat to 
community values than the drunk driver, who displayed no desire to 
take a life, and, if criminally negligent, likely had no awareness of 
the fatal risks of his conduct, though he should have. 
The social meaning work of criminal law also explains the 
significance that American criminal law gives the harm 
accomplished by an offender, both physical and relational. As many 
scholars have noted, and not a few complained, harm matters in 
American criminal law even independent of offender decision-
making.105 Attempts at crime and completed crimes are normally 
punished differently even if the offender’s choice to do wrong was 
the same, and the difference between success or failure was, from the 
defendant’s perspective, purely fortuitous.106 The difference is in the 
 
 105. See Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 363 (2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the 
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974). 
 106. On the concept of relational harms, see Samuel H. Pillsbury, Review Essay: Learning 
from Forgiveness, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 135, 144–46 (2009). 
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harm experienced by the community. The community experiences a 
completed rape differently than an attempted rape; a homicide 
(where the victim necessarily dies) differently than an attempted 
homicide. These crimes carry different social consequences and 
different social meanings. Punishment reflects not just an assessment 
of the offender’s choices, but the effects of those choices on the 
community. That is part of the social reality that punishment must 
address. 
As a result, judgments about the punishment of Evan Miller 
consider not just his choice-making capacities, but also the social-
moral meaning of his acts. That he sought to kill Cole Cannon, that 
he bashed him repeatedly in the head with a baseball bat and then, 
after leaving him bleeding and helpless, returned to the scene to set 
fire to Cannon’s trailer home matters because these facts indicate 
cruelty. They indicate an intentional attack on individual value and 
disregard for basic personal worth. Miller’s punishment therefore 
needs to be sufficient to demonstrate the community’s condemnation 
of that cruelty.107 
VIII.  CRUELTY AND THE PUNISHMENT OF VIOLENCE: 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN JUVENILE SENTENCING 
Throughout this Essay, my aim has been to suggest how the 
norm of cruelty might guide Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the 
punishment of juveniles. We now have all the pieces in place, 
historical, moral and conceptual, to offer at least a broad outline of 
what a cruelty approach to punishment might require here. We will 
see that cruelty’s direction in this context is largely procedural rather 
than substantive. This should not be surprising, both because of the 
difficulty of devising a constitutional theory of punishment that 
would provide clear substantive rules for sentencing, and because 
cruelty is a moral-emotive norm focused on how punishers approach 
the punishment decision rather than a rule dictating a particular penal 
result. 
 
 107. This discussion also shows why Kuntrell Jackson’s conduct was relatively less culpable 
under basic mens rea-reason analysis: he was a participant in the robbery and did not demonstrate 
purpose to kill in any of his words or conduct. 
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With respect to juveniles, the norm of cruelty supports three 
procedural requirements: (1) that the prosecution must have a full 
opportunity to present the facts of the defendant’s crime to establish 
its cruelty; (2) that, consistent with the holding in Miller, the defense 
must have a full opportunity to present all potential mitigation 
evidence with respect to the offender, and finally, (3) that if a severe 
sentence is imposed, the law should also require a subsequent 
proceeding in which a decision maker may reconsider the sentence in 
light of the juvenile’s subsequent maturity. This last requirement 
would render unconstitutional a sentence of life without chance of 
parole for a juvenile, even if discretionary. 
Requiring least discussion, because it involves no change in 
current law or practice, is the first requirement that facts in 
aggravation based on the nature of the crime of conviction be 
presented at sentencing. The only reason this even needs articulation 
is to emphasize that the norm of cruelty provides guidance with 
respect to assessing both the crime and the offender. Declaring the 
cruelty of criminal violence is an important goal for just punishment 
along with avoiding cruelty in the punishment of crime. The latter 
sets the constitutional bounds for punishment, but those bounds must 
comprehend the community’s need for punishment sufficient to 
condemn criminal violence. Stating both cruelty norms together also 
gives a clearer sense of the difficulty of the task of setting proper 
punishment for crimes of serious violence committed by juveniles. 
Requiring more discussion, but largely flowing from the 
previous analysis of Miller, is the requirement of individualized 
sentencing, with full presentation of any offender-mitigation facts.108 
The defense cannot be handicapped in the adversarial contest for 
decision-maker hearts and minds at sentencing. The defense must 
have the opportunity to appeal to sentencer empathy by presenting a 
wide range of facts concerning the offender, especially his or her life 
history. So, for example, the sentencer in the case of Evan Miller 
 
 108. For a similar argument based on the authority of Graham, see Beth Caldwell, Appealing 
to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 
64 ME. L. REV. 391 (2012). 
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should hear about the brutality, trauma, and disorganization of his 
home life. This did not occur at his original sentencing.109 
Miller’s father regularly violently beat Evan, his siblings, and 
his mother during Miller’s early years of life. The violence in 
Miller’s childhood home was so severe that Evan, at six years old, 
attempted to commit suicide to escape it.110 He would try to take his 
own life three more times in succeeding years.111 Eventually the 
State removed Evan and his siblings from the home because of abuse 
in the home. Evan was placed in foster care and remained there for 
two years until he was returned to the custody of his mother.112 
Evan’s mother was a drug addict and alcoholic who was often away 
from the home for sixteen hours at a time. The family moved so 
often in Evans’s childhood that his mother could not later remember 
all the schools he had attended.113 
Evan began drinking and using drugs as early as eight years 
old.114 Intoxicants used at an early age can have devastating effects 
on the brain and on overall development. Later Miller regularly used 
marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, and abused various 
prescription drugs.115 
Few people on hearing this account, especially if given by 
someone with firsthand knowledge, would view Evan Miller in the 
same way as if all they knew of him was what he did to Cole 
Cannon. That is why it is essential that full mitigation information be 
presented to a sentencer who has the ability to order a lesser sentence 
than the maximum provided by law, if the sentencer believes it 
warranted.116 
 
 109. In fact, Miller was sentenced to LWOP on the same day of his conviction “and without 
further proceedings.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-9646). Miller then “expressed remorse for his actions and apologized to the 
victim’s family, even though he knew it could not make any difference in the sentence he 
received.” Id.; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 110. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 111. Id. Counsel for Miller represented in his opening brief to the U.S. Supreme Court that 
Miller’s first suicide attempt was at age five and that he made a total of five more suicide 
attempts in his young life. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 109, at 4–5. 
 112. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 95, at 4. 
 113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 109, at 4. 
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Miller’s story is extreme, but not for that reason unusual for a young person charged 
with criminality, especially violent crime. Substance abuse begets substance abuse, trauma begets 
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Although my focus here has been on the Eighth Amendment and 
its mandates, there is another constitutional provision that is equally 
important here: the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel.117 Attorneys for juveniles facing long prison terms must 
conduct an extensive investigation to discover mitigating facts. They 
must then effectively present this evidence to the sentencing judge.118 
Such presentations should be similar to those made in death penalty 
cases.119 As in the capital context, this kind of presentation is not one 
for which many trial attorneys are presently trained or necessarily 
adept.120 It requires a focus on family and mental health issues far 
beyond anything needed for liability determinations. It requires 
building a close rapport with an often distrustful and reticent teenage 
client.121 It requires meeting family and others who know the youth. 
All this is an effort that few appointed attorneys (and almost all here 
are appointed rather than retained) currently have the time, 
investigative resources, or will to accomplish.122 Yet the right to a 
mitigation presentation will mean nothing if attorneys do not utilize 
it. This will require a fundamental change in defense practice in 
many jurisdictions. 
The last constitutional requirement, that juvenile offenders have 
an opportunity for reconsideration of severe sentences in later years 
based on the person that the offender has become, requires both 
elaboration and justification, not having been part of the discussion 
so far. The initial question is: How can a severe sentence such as a 
 
trauma, and violence begets violence, forming legacies handed down from one generation to the 
next. For a good introduction to the connection between trauma and juvenile delinquency, see 
Kristine Buffington, Carly B. Dierkhising & Shawn C. Marsh, Ten Things Every Juvenile Court 
Judge Should Know About Trauma and Delinquency, 61 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 13, 16 (2010). 
 117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 118. See Caldwell, supra note 108, at 402–10. 
 119. The Supreme Court began its ineffectiveness jurisprudence with a decision concerning a 
defense attorney’s mitigation presentation in a death penalty case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984). The claim was rejected there, but more recently the Court has found 
ineffectiveness in a number of death penalty cases because of shortcomings concerning mitigation 
presentations. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (defense counsel had duty to consider 
and prepare for prosecution’s evidence in aggravation in preparation for penalty phase hearing in 
capital case). 
 120. See Caldwell, supra note 108, at 416–20. 
 121. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 82, at 37–41. 
 122. Caldwell, supra note 108, at 416–20. 
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life sentence be cruel if there were no restrictions on the presentation 
of facts in aggravation and mitigation at sentencing, and the 
sentencer was free to impose a lesser sentence? Where is the 
culpable indifference to person-value if the unique value of the 
young person was fully presented at the sentencing hearing? The 
answer is that especially with juveniles, to value a person means to 
see that person not only as the unique human being that he or she is 
but also to appreciate the possibilities of who that person might 
become. 
A fundamental attribute of humanity is that humans can change. 
The greatest changes occur in childhood, adolescence, and early 
adulthood. If there is no mechanism for reconsideration of sentences 
for juveniles, this critical aspect of human value is denied legal 
recognition. Without a reconsideration opportunity, the fact that a 
teen who was impulsive, reckless, and without moral grounding, 
becomes an adult who has none of these traits, does not matter. That 
aspect of value, the value of becoming, is explicitly denied. 
Making a life sentence irrevocable and unreviewable imposes a 
radically narrowed view of the offender’s value.123 Long mandatory 
sentences reduce an individual to a crime category, permanently. An 
LWOP sentence for a juvenile precludes legal reconsideration of the 
sentence and therefore constitutes indifference to the value of the 
person the teen might become. Thus the sentence demonstrates a 
cruel attitude toward the offender’s worth; it should be held 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.124 
 
 123. As Justice Kennedy put it: “By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, 
the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.” Graham, 
130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 124. This requirement is consistent with the Court’s holding in Graham that a defendant 
sentenced to a life without chance of parole sentence be afforded “some meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 2029–30; see also 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without parole for 
juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 (Cal. 
2012) (concluding that a “110-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of 
nonhomicide offenses contravenes Graham’s mandate against cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.”). These cases reversed the original life sentence (which was either 
LWOP in name or function), contemplating a resentencing proceeding, rather than establishing a 
procedure for subsequent reconsideration of a lawful sentence. For a related argument, that 
Graham should be seen as a procedural decision, involving a right to discretionary parole 
consideration, as well as a substantive one setting a limit on length of sentence, see Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, supra note 72. 
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Here it is worth taking just a moment to detail why it is so 
difficult for a trial court, especially one accustomed to adult 
defendants, to make a sound penological assessment of youthful 
offenders at the time of sentencing.125 The court often must sentence 
for a crime of particularly senseless violence, as in Miller or in the 
companion case of Jackson.126 The apparent senselessness of the 
violence seems to make the defendant appear both dangerous and 
depraved. The defendant will often appear to the court to be quite 
clueless about what he has done. We can see this in many cases, but 
particularly in the sentencing address in the Graham case, where the 
court professed exasperation and bewilderment at Graham’s bad life 
choices.127 
Youthful offenders often have significant learning disabilities. 
They have almost all experienced difficulty in school. Many, like 
Miller, suffer from serious mental illness. Many, like Miller, have 
serious substance abuse histories, leading to a loss of cognitive 
abilities, or at least a significant delay in their development. As a 
group, they are not very articulate, especially in an intimidating adult 
environment like the courtroom. With their histories of trauma and 
substance abuse, growing up in families and communities where 
introspection is a rare quality and survival—emotional and 
physical—an almost daily struggle, they have few resources for 
understanding themselves. 
Many youthful offenders truly are clueless about what they have 
done and why. They often do not understand their own motives or 
emotional dynamics. They may express true bewilderment at their 
own actions. Often they do come to a mature understanding of the 
consequences of their actions in later years. Similarly, at the time of 
their sentencing, many do not fully understand the sentence they 
receive. That is a realization that also often comes years later.128 
 
 125. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 126. By senseless here I mean lacking in the kinds of reasons that one might expect could 
motivate an adult to serious violence. Juvenile murders often are extremely impulsive acts with 
little prospect of selfish gain and a high chance of capture and punishment. See, for example, the 
Kuntrell Jackson case, in which the shooter killed the video store clerk when she did not provide 
money at his demand. The three would-be robbers then fled the scene without taking anything. 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 127. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019–20. 
 128. In an interview after he was resentenced in 2012 and given a twenty-five year term, 
Terrance Graham told a reporter: “To me the 25 year sentence hurt more than the life sentence.” 
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Given all this, it can be extraordinarily difficult for a court to 
distinguish between an individual whose cluelessness may be due to 
transient factors such as youth and home environment, and those 
whose disposition to violence and antisocial conduct is more deeply 
set, as in the condition of psychopathy. 
There is considerably more to say about this requirement of 
subsequent reconsideration than can be managed in the confines of 
this Essay. Questions such as how long the original sentence needs to 
be to trigger the reconsideration requirement, when that 
reconsideration should occur, the basic parameters for the 
reconsideration decision, who should make it, and on what 
evidentiary basis are among the most important. The requirement of 
the legal opportunity may also presume some right to programs in 
prison in which a prisoner could concretely demonstrate personal 
change. Prisoners serving LWOP often are housed at the highest 
security level where programs are few, if any.129 
It is sufficient for my present task to show that the basic 
prohibition on cruelty entails procedures that maximize the chance 
that those responsible for incarceration decisions will see the value of 
the person punished, and that for juvenile offenders this entails a 
reconsideration opportunity following the imposition of a life 
sentence or equivalent. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
From his middle seat on the high bench of the courtroom of the 
United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren often asked 
 
Jeff Kunerth, Terrence Graham’s First Interview, TROUT (May 16, 2012), 
http://jeffkunerth.com/post/23161353754/terrence-grahams-first-interview. He explained that 
when he received a life sentence at seventeen, it never seemed real to him. “Something inside me 
said it wasn’t really real. I never felt in my heart I was going to do a life sentence. I guess that’s 
why it didn’t settle in like the 25 years.” Id. Graham was twenty-five years old when he was 
resentenced. Jeff Kunerth, Life Without Parole Becomes 25 Years for Terrance Graham, Subject 
of U.S. Supreme Court Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://articles.orlando.com/2012-02-04/features/os-life-without-parole-terrance-graham-
20120224-12-1-terrance-graham-resentencing-parole/2. Youth who receive long sentences in 
their teens frequently report that they did not comprehend the severity and reality of the sentence 
until years later, usually in their mid-twenties. 
 129. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 82, at 56–60 (discussing juvenile LWOP in the 
California prison system). 
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a simple question that confounded lawyers arguing before the Court: 
“But is it fair?”130 
The question stumped many advocates; it also confounded, 
annoyed, and even enraged many legal observers. What kind of a 
question is that, Is it fair? It is not a question about statutory 
interpretation or constitutional text. It does not address precedent or 
jurisprudence. How is this even a legal question? 
In truth, Earl Warren’s fairness inquiry was in many ways a 
layman’s query. It was not grounded in any agreed-upon legal 
authority. Warren was asking a moral question, drawing on basic 
American values. Earl Warren believed that such values were at the 
heart of constitutional law. 
Earl Warren was a man of extraordinary moral confidence, a 
confidence that can be traced to his personality, his professional 
experience, and his times. Before coming to the Court he had worked 
as a deputy district attorney and then a prominent elected district 
attorney, then the elected California attorney general, and finally a 
popular and successful governor of the state. In all of these roles he 
took strong stands on issues of right and wrong. He was part of the 
generation that led the nation to victory over the Axis powers in 
World War II and after the war, took on the nation’s longest standing 
and greatest failure of its promise of citizen freedom: its laws and 
customs of race discrimination.131 Warren had an abiding faith in 
basic American values of equality and freedom that informed his 
constitutional jurisprudence. So it seemed to him, in an early 
plurality opinion that is still widely cited by the Court and 
commentators, that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment should depend on “evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”132 For 
Warren, the constitutional prohibition could not be divorced from 
American morals. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren is long gone from the Court and so 
also is his confidence that basic moral values should guide 
constitutional law. I cite his example here because of the contrast it 
 
 130. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 451 
(2006); Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice Warren’s Fair Question, 58 GEO. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1969). 
 131. NEWTON, supra note 130, at 452. 
 132. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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provides to the Court’s current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
which largely avoids moral discourse, despite the Amendment’s 
explicitly moral text.133 
I have argued throughout that we need to talk about cruelty—
and therefore speak morally—when considering the Eighth 
Amendment’s rule for the punishment of juvenile offenders. Cruelty 
provides a moral standard, deeply rooted in Anglo-American history 
and with a foundation in constitutional text, that can provide 
normative guidance for contemporary punishment questions. It 
cannot settle the question of what punishment is just in a particular 
case, but it can provide important procedural safeguards for the 
decision process. And at least in some cases, it can better address the 
normative issues involved than the standards currently employed by 
the Court. 
Science’s insights into adolescent brain development may (and I 
believe should) inform punishment decision-making and 
constitutional standards. But criminal liability and punishment rules 
have nonscientific foundations. Criminal law sets fundamental rules 
for conduct in a community. These are based on moral expectations, 
on what we believe is fair to ask of each other individually, and on 
what is necessary for the community.134 Science can never decide 
these questions. They concern the human world we choose to make, 
not just the world that is, which is science’s exclusive concern. 
Similarly, legislative and decisional trends across the nation, and 
even internationally, may inform the Court’s assessment of 
 
 133. The “cruel” prohibition in the Eighth Amendment is the only explicitly moral term in the 
Bill of Rights or the Constitution in the sense of making reference to a personal virtue or vice. 
Several Justices in modern times have acknowledged the moral nature of its rule. For instance, 
Justice Stevens has described “the moral commitment embodied in the Eighth Amendment.” 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2021 
(majority opinion) (“‘[T]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily 
embodies a moral judgment.’” (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008))). 
  In biting dissents in the juvenile punishment cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas criticized 
what they called the moralizing of the majority in Eighth Amendment decisions, placing the word 
moral in quotations to indicate their belief that it signifies nothing more than the personal policy 
preferences of the majority rather than a norm capable of or appropriate to constitutional 
direction. In their view, the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has no 
moral content beyond prohibiting the kinds of punishments generally deemed barbarous by late 
eighteenth-century English and American courts and commentators. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 134. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 143, 158 (2009). 
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“evolving standards of decency,” but they cannot provide a reliable 
constitutional rule. The Eighth Amendment is part of the Bill of 
Rights, which was designed to guard against the excesses of the 
majority.135 Few groups are more vulnerable to majoritarian abuse 
than those convicted of serious crime.136 We need a clear counter-
majoritarian rule to protect against penal cruelty. And the 
Constitution gives us one. 
Taking cruelty seriously as an Eighth Amendment norm 
involves a recognition, faithful to the views of this nation’s founders, 
of our human limitations as decision-makers. The human desire to 
make messy and complex problems simple so that they accord with 
our strongest initial feelings is powerful always, and especially so in 
punishment. It can easily lead to penal excess. The temptation to 
reduce persons convicted of crime to legal categories, to criminals of 
a particular type, and thereby restrict our view of their unique value, 
has great emotional appeal. At first glance it even seems to have 
moral content. Do the crime, and you do the time. The Eighth 
Amendment stands as a historical and legal reminder, though, that 
basic justice requires more. It requires concern for individual human 
value. 
We cannot have confidence in the justice of any severe 
punishment given to a young offender unless the person to be 
punished has had a meaningful opportunity to appeal to the empathy 
of the sentencer by presenting a full life history and possibilities for 
future good. If a young offender is then given a life sentence, we 
cannot be confident of the justice of that sentence going forward 
unless he or she is afforded an opportunity in later years for 
reconsideration in light of the person that he or she has become. 
Without these procedural protections, any life sentence for a juvenile 
offender should be considered cruel, both morally and 
constitutionally. 
 
 135. Ryan, supra note 5, at 93. 
 136. Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 47, 55–56 (2007); see also Ryan, supra note 5, at 93 (noting “counter-majoritarian 
power . . . is undermined by relying solely on the Court’s consultation of the objective factors, 
such as state legislative action, and by eschewing the Court’s own judgment on the issue”). 
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